physical, vital experience which distinguishes itself from the rest of being, and that is what we think •of as ourselves in nature—this individualisation of being in becoming. We then proceed to conceive 'of ourselves as something which has thus individualised itself and only exists so long as it is individualised,—a temporary or at least a temporal becoming; or else we conceive of ourselves as some- one who supports or causes the individualisation, .an immortal being perhaps but limited by its individuality. This perception and this conception 'constitute our ego-sense. Normally, we go no farther in our knowledge of our individual existence.

But in the end we have to see that our individualisation is only a superficial formation, a practical selection and limited conscious synthesis for the temporary utility of life in a particular body, or else it is a constantly changing and developing synthesis pursued through successive lives in successive bodies. Behind it there is a •consciousness, a Purusha, who is not determined or limited by his individualisation or by this synthesis but on the contrary determines, supports and yet

'exceeds it. That which he selects from in order
to construct this synthesis, is his total experience of
the world-being. Therefore our individualisation
•exists by virtue of the world-being, but also by
virtue of a consciousness which uses the world-being
for experience of its possibilities of individuality.
These two powers. Person and his world-material,

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